Language on Holiday and the Philosophy of Mind: A Linguistically Sensitive Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness, Pain, and Psychological Predicates

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to debates about three topics in the philosophy of mind: phenomenal consciousness, pain, and the extension of psychological predicates. Chapter 1 outlines my metaphilosophical views and gives a roadmap to the thesis. Chapter 2 argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’ phrase as it is characteristically used in the literature on phenomenal consciousness has a technical meaning. I argue that this has the consequence that the phrase says nothing informative about phenomenal consciousness and that lay people’s use of the phrase does not show that they believe in phenomenal consciousness. Chapter 3 argues that eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness is a view worth taking seriously. First, I clarify the eliminativist position, then I explain its motivation. Finally, I draw on the discussion in chapter 2 and argue that there is no compelling evidence for lay belief in phenomenal consciousness, hence that we are currently not in a position to say whether common sense counts in favour of eliminativism or realism. Chapter 4 addresses the main problem for eliminativism – the problem of explaining why people believe in phenomenality. I discuss four recently proposed theories and conclude that we are currently not in a position to tell which of these is the most promising eliminativist-friendly explanation of belief in phenomenality, but that the potential of (at least some of) these theories confirms the claim that eliminativism is a view worth taking seriously. Chapter 5 defends the Bodily Theory of pain, according to which pains are bodily occurrences located in an extra-cranial body part, which contrasts with the Experiential Theory, according to which pains are experiences located in the mind or brain. Chapter 6 discusses what a defender of the Bodily Theory should say about the pain-in-mouth argument, i.e. the step from (1) There is a pain in my finger, and (2) My finger is in my mouth, to (3) There is a pain in my mouth. Several accounts have been offered to explain why (1)-(3) sounds wrong. In chapter 6 I offer a novel account – the mereological view – that entails the Bodily Theory of pain. Chapter 7 discusses cognitive scientists’ ascription of psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. when cognitive scientists say things like ‘The brain thinks’. I propose the Synecdoche View, according to which the locutions of cognitive scientists are figurative, with ‘the brain’ referring to the human being, such that ‘The brain thinks’ reports the thinking of the human being, not the thinking of the brain. One consequence of this is that the locutions of cognitive scientists offer no reason to believe that psychological predicates extend to brains. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by offering a speculative error theory, according to which some of my opponents’ views are based on conceptual conflations.Aker Scholarshi

Wittgenstein's Critique of Moore in On Certainty

This paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in On Certainty, and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an (access-) internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights (which he shares with Wittgenstein) properly

What-it’s-like talk is technical talk

Acknowledgements: Thanks to Arif Ahmed, David Chalmers, Marta Halina, Richard Holton, participants at Oslo Mind Group, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to Aker Scholarship for financial support.Funder: Aker ScholarshipAbstractIt is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning, i.e. a meaning for which the association to the relevant expression is peculiar to a theoretical community. The relevant theoretical community is philosophy and some parts of cognitive science, so on this view, only philosophers and cognitive scientists use the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in the way that is characteristic in the literature on phenomenal consciousness. This claim has important consequences. Firstly, I argue that the phrase says nothing informative about phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, I argue that the fact that non-philosophers use the phrase is not compelling evidence that they believe in phenomenal consciousness. These claims have further consequences for debates about phenomenal consciousness.</jats:p

What-it’s-like talk is technical talk

Acknowledgements: Thanks to Arif Ahmed, David Chalmers, Marta Halina, Richard Holton, participants at Oslo Mind Group, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to Aker Scholarship for financial support.Funder: Aker ScholarshipIt is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning, i.e. a meaning for which the association to the relevant expression is peculiar to a theoretical community. The relevant theoretical community is philosophy and some parts of cognitive science, so on this view, only philosophers and cognitive scientists use the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in the way that is characteristic in the literature on phenomenal consciousness. This claim has important consequences. Firstly, I argue that the phrase says nothing informative about phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, I argue that the fact that non-philosophers use the phrase is not compelling evidence that they believe in phenomenal consciousness. These claims have further consequences for debates about phenomenal consciousness

Does the Brain Think?

Funder: Aker ScholarshipAbstractIt is common in cognitive science to ascribe psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. to assert that the brain sees, feels, thinks, etc. This has prompted philosophical debate. According to the Nonsense View, the relevant locutions of cognitive scientists are nonsensical or false (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2007). According to the Literal View, they are literal truths and report the psychological properties of brains (Dennett 2007; Crane 2015; Figdor 2018). In this paper, I propose the Synecdoche View, according to which cognitive scientists’ locutions are figurative, with ‘brain’ referring to the human being, such that ‘the brain thinks’ reports the thinking of the human being, not the thinking of the brain. I compare this view to the dominant views in the literature and argue that it is a plausible alternative. One consequence of this is that there is no reason to believe that the locutions of cognitive scientists indicate empirical support for the claim that brains possess psychological properties.</jats:p

The Bodily Theory of Pain

Acknowledgements: Thanks to Arif Ahmed, Murat Aydede, Adam Bradley, Ludvig Fæhn Fuglestvedt, Marta Halina, Richard Holton, Colin Klein, Daniel Ott, Oscar Westerblad, two anonymous referees, and audiences at the Joint Session 2019 and Oslo Mind Group for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks to Aker Scholarship for financial support.AbstractOne use of the noun ‘pain’ is exemplified in sentences like ‘There is a pain in my foot’. According to the Experiential Theory, ‘pain’ in this context refers to an experience located in the mind or brain. According to the Bodily Theory, it refers to an extra-cranial bodily occurrence located in a body part. In this paper, I defend the Bodily Theory. Specifically, I argue that pains are proximal activations of nociceptors that cause experiences of pain. This view is preferable to the Experiential Theory, because it accords better with common sense and offers a better interpretation or semantics of ordinary pain reports.</jats:p